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11. Introduction
Recent work in the theory of international trade and industrial organisation has shown that
depending on tax and tariff schedules, the multinational firm (hereafter the MNF) has the
incentive to increase its after-tax profits by shifting taxable income from high tax countries
to low tax countries by altering transfer prices. Transfer prices are significant for both
taxpayers and tax administration purposes, because they determine in large part the
income and expenses, and therefore taxable profits, of associated enterprises in different
tax jurisdictions. Changes therefore in the transfer price, that is the price at which intra-
firm trade are valued between divisions of a multinational firm can substantially affect the
revenue of the government in which it operates. The price that the MNF charge for its
internal transactions is not determined by market forces, but that prices are set with the
stated objectives of minimizing global tax liabilities, distribute risk and provide incentives
for local managers, among others.
To most national governments this behaviour of multinational firms constitutes tax and
tariff evasion as the transfer price is potentially a profit shifting device of the MNF in order
to save on profit taxes and tariffs. There is well documented empirical evidence to support
this claim.1 To control these manipulations of the transfer price by the MNF many
countries regulate transfer pricing by means of the so call arm’s- length principle. Thus
when the MNF over-invoice (under-invoice) it is the home country (the host country) which
wants to control transfer price manipulations by the imposition of a penalty. The
multinational firm’s optimum transfer price would either be the highest or the lowest
possible.2 These limits on transfer price were determined by government rules and
regulations. However regulatory agencies do have the problem of sometimes establishing
what constitute a ‘fair’ transfer price, this is because a substantial part of intra-firm trade is
in goods where arm’s length prices are not easily established3. Given the prominence of
the profit shifting argument for government intervention in international trade and the
significance of transfer pricing, it is not surprising that there is a substantial and
sophisticated literature studying this phenomenon. Several papers have extended Horst
1 See Weichenrieder (1996), Hines (1999), and Gresik (2001)
2 Horst (1971).
3 Markusen (2002)
2(1971) model and have shown that the profit shifting motives, in the presence of
governmental restraints, directly influence the multinational firm’s decision variables,
regarding prices, quantities, and production location.4
According to Copithorne (1971) firms have two transfer prices which they charge for intra-
firm exchanges that is the shadow price based on marginal cost and an external price for
tax and tariff authourities. Elitzur and Mintz (1996) examine the role of the transfer pricing
rules on tax competition between fully-informed governments, while Bond and Gresik
(1996) develop a common-agency theoretical approach in which production cost is
unobservable by both the home and the foreign governments and where the emphasis is
on trade taxes instead of transfer pricing as a regulatory device to control firm behaviour.
In a similar paper Moller and Scharf (2002) rather focus on direct regulation of transfer
price and show that strategic transfer pricing regulation leads to excessive taxation that
reduces multinational firms output and intra-firm trade. Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001)
discuss the effects of transfer pricing on the equilibrium tax rate.
One major problem of the Horst (1971) model is that the multinational firm decision to
charge the lowest or highest transfer price results in a corner solution. This paper would
introduce a penalty schema which constrains the multinational firm to charge a transfer
price in the interior. To achieve this we follow Kant (1988) by assuming that the
government have a guideline that the transfer price should be equal to the arm’s length
price. The probability of imposing a transfer price penalty depends on the divergence
between the transfer price charged and the arm’s length price. This approach would help
show how the transfer price effects may determine whether we have corner or interior
solutions. One particular extension which would be most interesting from the perspective
of this paper is to assume exogenously determined transfer prices and these are set by
government regulations. In this model the comparative static results would be derived to
enable us to analyse the optimal transfer pricing policy under Cournot competition, and
the strategic interaction effects on the behaviour of the multinational firm under varying tax
and tariff rates and the transfer price. Tax and tariff policies which affect the behaviour of
multinational firms are designed so as to achieve some policy goals, the aim of this paper
4 See Samuelson (1982), Eden (1985) and Madan (1992, 2000) for more details
3is to examine the effects of government optimal trade policy in relation to import tariffs,
profit tax rates and the strategic interaction of firms in the presence of transfer pricing.
The anticipated results are the following. First, the MNF would over invoice in the
presence of government regulation to control the transfer price by choosing an optimal
transfer price which is more than the marginal cost of production. Second, changes in the
tax rates and the tariff rates have a direct and an indirect effect on the nature of
competition in the host market. Under strategic interaction considerations, the transfer
price is used as a strategic device by the MNF to defuse competition with its rival in the
host market. Third, for welfare implications under transfer pricing regime a change in the
tax rate results in the profit shifting motive and the transfer pricing effect move in the same
direction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
framework and then derives the equilibrium transfer price under varying tax and tariff
regimes in the absence of a penalty schema. In section 3 we analyse the optimal values
of the decision variables of the MNF and the host firm under strategic interaction when
firms are quantity setters. Section 4 develops the comparative static analysis of the
behaviour of the firms under varying tax and tariff regimes. Section 5 examines the
strategic interaction and its effects on host firm behaviour. Section 6 looks at the welfare
implications of the government policy instruments. Section 7 provides the conclusions.
2. The Model
The theoretical framework used in the analysis of this section is based on the models of
Horst (1971) and Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997). Horst (1971) explores the profit
maximization strategy for a monopolistic firm selling in two markets simultaneously in the
presence of transfer pricing and how the firm react to a given set of tariff and tax rates.
Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997) extended the monopolistic model by introducing
competition in the final good market in the host country. According to Schjelderup and
Sorgard (1997), in the absence of tax and tariff rates under Cournot competition the MNF
would set the transfer price below marginal cost. In the model developed here we
introduce the Horst (1971) model by assuming strategic interaction between the MNF
subsidiary and the host firm and examine the behaviour of the MNF under varying tax and
4tariff rates. By incorporating competition into the Horst (1971) model relates the present
study to the strategic trade policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985) where
government policies are used to shift above-normal profits from foreign to national firms.
This is because the strategic role of the transfer price is similar to the role of export
subsidies (taxes) in the strategic trade policy models.
Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997) develop the comparative static results for firms facing
Cournot and Bertrand competition to investigate how transfer prices are set. In this model
however, we introduce three types of government policy instruments that is the trade
policy instrument, the profit taxes and the government regulation on the transfer price. We
first examine the effects of each policy instrument on the decision variables of the MNF
(output and transfer price). Then we derive the comparative static analysis to assess the
direct and indirect impact of a change in government policy in relation to the profit tax,
tariff rates and the transfer price on firm behaviour. We further introduce into our model a
penalty schema that enables us to derive interior solutions for the transfer price.
Consider a multinational firm with a parent firm located in the home (source) country (h)
and a wholly owned subsidiary located in the foreign (host) country (f). The parent firm
produces a final good in both the home country and the foreign country denoted as y  and
*y  respectively. The final good is sold in the home country yielding a profit )(yRh  at a price
)( yph with 0<¢hp . It is assumed that marginal revenue is positive and decreasing in y  :
that is, 0)( >¢ yRh  and 0)( <¢¢ yRh , where primes denote partial derivatives. Similarly in the
absence of competition *y  is also sold in the foreign country market at a price )( *yp f
yielding revenue )( ** yR  with 0<¢fp , 0)( <¢¢
*yR f . We assume that the marginal cost of
production is increasing in both countries for all positive values of y  and *y , that is 0>¢c
and 0>¢¢c . The parent firm exports a part of its output to the subsidiary firm in the host
country at a transfer price tp . Let x denote the quantity of intra-firm trade between the
parent firm and the subsidiary located in the foreign country. In considering the market for
the final product, we assume that the two markets are segmented and without loss of
5generality we omit the possibility that the final product is also sold in the home and host
country.5
Horst (1971), in exploring the impact of tariff and tax rates on the profit-maximizing
strategy of the firm assumes the MNF to be a monopolist in the two countries. This paper
would extend the analysis by introducing oligopolistic competition in the foreign country by
assuming that the MNF faces competition from a firm k in the foreign country. Firm k
output is denoted as ky  sold at price )( kk yp  obtaining revenue )( kk yR .
It is assumed the MNF faces imperfectly competitive markets and practise price
discrimination in the two markets. Let t  and it  for fhi ,= be the add-valorem tariff on the
intra-firm imports and the income tax imposed in country i respectively, then the profit
function of the MNF in both the home country and the foreign country is:
(1) xpxyCyR thhh ++-= )()(p ,
(2) xpxyCyyR tfkff )1()()( tp +---= ** ,
where xpt )1( t+  equals the subsidiary import cost including the tariff.
The profit function of firm k in the foreign country is represented as follows:
(3) )()( kkkkk yCyyR -=
*p .
It is assumed that profit taxation in the home country is based on the source principle and
that the net profits of the subsidiary firm are repatriated to the parent firm. The MNF is
taxed at the rate ht  at home and ft  of affiliate’s profit. A number of countries, for example,
the United States offer tax credit for taxes already paid to the foreign governments by the
foreign subsidiary. Under this tax credit system two cases have to be considered, that is,
fh tt < and fh tt ³  when there is no penalty for such transfer price manipulation.
5 Brander and Spencer (1985)
6(a) when fh tt < , the maximum allowable tax credit is equal to the home tax rate on foreign
income, fht p . Thus foreign profits are not taxed in the home country. The global after tax
profit of the MNF is written as:
(4) ffhh tt pp )1()1( -+-=P
Using equations (1) and (2) we can rewrite the net global profit function of the MNF as
follows
(5) ( ) ( ) [ ] xptttxyCyRtxyCyRt tfhffffhhh t)1()()()()1()()()1( ---+---++--=P ** .
To examine how the MNF transfer price decisions respond to the changes in tax rate and
tariff rate, we differentiate (5) with respect to tp :
(6) t)(
)1(
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0)( <>
-
-
=<>=
¶
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p
.
Equation (6) indicates that T which is the relative tax differential between the importing
and the exporting country determines the sign of tp¶Õ¶ . If the MNF can manipulate
transfer prices, similar to Horst (1971) it follows that when t)(<>T  the MNF should
choose the higher (lowest) transfer price to minimize its tax and tariff payments. Thus the
profit tax rate in both the home country and the host country positively or negatively affect
the transfer pricing regime. Transfer price in this set up act as a profit shifting device by
MNF in the presence of tax and tariff differential rates between countries.
(b) when fh tt ³ , full credit is given and this is equal to the amount of foreign tax paid by
the subsidiary, fft p . The net rate of taxation on foreign profit that the parent firm pays is
ffh tt p)( - . Then the MNF global tax payment is equal to ffhff ttt pp )( -+ . The home
country collects hht p  from local resident firms. The MNF global after tax profit is:
(7) ))(1( fhht pp +-=P
7(8) txt
p ht
)1( --=
¶
P¶ .
Equation (8) shows that the MNF has an incentive to choose the lowest possible transfer
price for its intra-firm trade when the foreign taxes are lower than home tax rate, in order
to save on tariff cost. In the absence of a penalty for non-arm’s length pricing and strategic
interaction between firms, transfer pricing constitute an avenue for income shifting. Thus if
tax and tariff rates are the only policy instrument available to the government, then the
MNF would either over-invoice or under-invoice the transfer price of its intra-firm transfers
in order to minimize its tariff and profit tax cost.6
Governments are aware of these transfer price abuses by MNFs. There is international
consensus that the arm’s length principle should guide the determination of transfer price
for tax purposes. Although the transfer price regulation of most countries varies in its
specific details, in most OECD countries, corporate income tax law requires that the
transfer price corresponds with the price that two unrelated firms would charge for the
same product under similar circumstances7. As more firms become highly vertically
integrated and custom’s valuation of prices is not completely rigid, regulatory agencies do
sometimes have the problem of establishing what actually constitute a ‘fair’ transfer price,8
and multinational firms are left room to manipulate transfer prices within certain limits.
The United States government in 1990 (Internal Revenue Code section 6662) introduced
a transfer price penalty for cases where the MNF transfer price differs significantly from
the arm’s length price. For the 46 international tax codes investigated 27 of these
countries have been found to have explicit transfer pricing penalty legislature modelled on
the US legislation.9 What these tax laws therefore imply is that both the OECD Guideline
and the US regulations require that the transfer price charged by MNF in their internal
transactions be equal to the ‘shadow price’ or the arm’s length price denoted by p . In this
set up the arm’s length price is equal to marginal cost ( cp = ). Throughout we assume that
this arm length price regime is exogenously given and is set by government regulation.
6 Raimondos-Moller and Scharf (1996)
7 OECD (1994)
8 See, for example, Verlage (1975)
9 Ernst and Young (2004)
8The Penalty Schema
Following Kant (1988) we can make the realistic assumption that there is some probability
d  of a penalty of known size a  being levied if the transfer price differs from the true cost
of production. To simplify the analysis we examine the case where the MNF charges the
high transfer price. The properties of the probability function are given as follows:
ppp t ˆ<<  which implies 0)( =- pptd , for ppt £ , and 1)( =- pptd , for ppt ˆ³ . Thus pˆ  is a
threshold transfer price where the MNF is penalized with certainty. More specifically we
assume that the MNF incurs this cost in addition to the income tax rate t on the MNF’s
profits per unit of intra-firm trade x. The deviation cost denoted as f  is equal to
[ ]xppt t )( -ad  where 0>¢d  and 0>¢¢d , by this assumption transfer price manipulation
below or above the arm’s length standard constitutes an additional cost on firm profits and
this penalty cost would be larger, the higher the probability of assessment d , the greater
the degree of transfer price manipulation )( ppt -  and the larger the volume of  intra-firm
trade x. Given the above assumptions the MNF objective function in the presence of the
penalty schema is given as:
(9) [ ] [ ]xppttt tffhh )()1()1( ---+-=P adpp ,
3. Strategic Interaction under Cournot Competition
Firms in this set-up are assumed to be quantity setters and that Cournot competition
prevails in the market for the final good. The MNF chooses the quantities *yy,  and x and
the transfer price to maximize (9) taking the output of its rival and the prior committed
values of government instruments as given. Simultaneously, the host firm chooses its
output ky  to maximize (3) taken as given the MNF output of the final good and the
government decision variables. The first-order conditions of the strategic interaction model
assuming quantity setting competition is as follows:
(10) ( ) [ ] 0)()( =-¢-- xpptxtxT tff dat ,
9(11) 0=¢-¢ hh CR ,
(12) 0=¢-¢ ff CR ,
(13) [ ]pptpptCpTpCC tfthtthf -¢--¢--+¢=¢ ()()( dat ,
(14) 0=¢-¢ kk CR .
The first order conditions (10)-(14) define the equilibrium values of the decision variables
of the MNF and the host firm where T is the relative differential between the home and
host country tax rates. Equation (11) and (12) state that the after tax marginal cost of
producing the final good in both the home and the foreign country by the MNF should be
equal to the after tax marginal cost. Equation (13) is the condition that determines the
amount of intra-firm trade between the MNF located in the home country and the
subsidiary located in the host country. This condition equates the marginal cost of
production in the host country to the marginal cost of intra-firm trade and this is equal to
the MNF’s marginal cost of production of the intra-firm exports plus the tariff cost per unit
of x less the tax advantage of producing in the home country and the marginal cost due to
the penalty on non arm’s-length pricing. Thus equation (13) is the steering mechanism
which binds the final goods markets of the MNF in the two countries. Condition (14)
determines the production of the final good by the host country firm which equates the
after tax marginal revenue to the after tax marginal cost of production.
Equation (10) defines the equilibrium level of the transfer price. The first term on the left
hand side is the marginal gain obtained from tax differential between the home country
and the host country and the second term is the marginal cost due to the penalty for non
arm’s-length pricing. Equation (10) shows that the MNF would want to over-invoice its
exports if t>T  from (6), thus, ppt >  implying that 0>¢d . Given that the penalty
constitutes an additional cost to the MNF after tax profit, provided this penalty is
sufficiently high or that fh tt = there is a disincentive for transfer price manipulation by the
MNF and consolidated net profit is concave in tp and X , and ppt = . However from
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equation (10) it is not optimal for the MNF to charge ppt £  since the MNF equates the
marginal gain in tax arbitrage to the marginal cost of the penalty, that is:
(14’) ( ) [ ]xpptxtxT tff )()( -¢=- dat .
This implies that ( ) 0>-=
¶
P¶ xT
pt
t  when hf tt > . Alternatively when ppt ˆ>  the MNF is
penalized with certainty, and given that the MNF is accessed a higher penalty, the
marginal cost (right hand side) of equation (14’) is greater than the left hand side. In the
situation of an increasing marginal cost due to over invoicing, to minimize the rising cost
the MNF would charge a transfer price in the interior, that is, )ˆ,( pppt Î .
The optimal transfer price can be obtained as follows:
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In its strategic transfer pricing behaviour, the MNF would over invoice by choosing an
optimal transfer price which is more than the marginal cost of production or the arm’s
length price. In the presence of the penalty the incentive to manipulate the transfer price is
reduced, this is because the higher the penalty (a ) the less likely the MNF would over
invoice because the cost of the penalty rises. The MNF trades off the gains from non-
arm’s length pricing to the marginal cost of the penalty. In this paper the case fh tt ¹ is
assumed. Thus the opportunity for transfer price manipulation exist, however the penalty
provides an additional constraint on the MNF transfer pricing strategy thereby reducing its
overall net profit from tax arbitrage, this leads us to proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Under Cournot competition when tax arbitrage exist, and 0>d ,  the  MNF
sets cpt ¢> .
The economic interpretation of proposition 1 is quite intuitive. The presence of the penalty
makes the MNF charge a transfer price that is higher than the arm’s length price. It is only
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when the MNF is accessed a higher penalty would it move its transfer price towards the
arm’s length price. The higher the profit tax differential rate between the home country and
foreign country the higher the optimal transfer price. The MNF has an incentive to
increase the transfer price in order to shift profits from the foreign country to the home
country due to the higher foreign profit tax rate. The tariff rate however has the opposite
effect on the MNF transfer pricing regime.
Proposition 2. When fh tt =  the MNF would set ppt
w<  and ii) choose ppt
w=  only when
0=d .
This is quite clear. In the absence of tax arbitrage the only government instrument is the
import tariff. To minimize the tariff cost the MNF would choose a lower transfer price for its
internal transactions10.
4. Comparative Static Analysis
To determine the comparative static effects of a change in the tariff rate t and tax
differential rate T on y , *y , x tp and
ky  we totally differentiate the first order conditions to
get the system of equation in (A.14). Assuming that the second order conditions for profit
maximization hold that is: 0<P yy , **P yy < 0, 0<P * kyy , 0<P xx , 0>D , the following
comparative static results are obtained:
(16) 0<=
dT
dy , 0>=
*
dT
dy 0>=
dT
dx , *
P
=
dydy
dsign
dT
dysign k
k 2
, )( kft RRsigndT
dpsign =
(17) 0>=
td
dy , 0<=
*
td
dy , 0<=
td
dx , *
P-=
dydy
dsign
d
dysign k
k 2
t
, )( kft RRsignd
dpsign -=
t
10 This is contrary to the established literature where the transfer price is equal to the marginal cost. See Horst (1971)
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The imposition of a tariff has a direct effect on the MNF decision variables ( tpxandyy ,, * )
and an indirect effect (strategic effect) on the host country firm’s output ky  as  the  MNF
adjust its decision variables in response to a change in t .
The direct effect of the tariff (t ) on the MNF is to reduce *y , this is because as the tariff
cost per unit of x increases, the export cost of x to the subsidiary in the foreign country
increases. Marginal cost for the intra-firm therefore increases, and this affects the MNF
marginal revenue in the production of *y  independent of the transfer pricing regime. From
(17) the MNF therefore decreases the production and export of the x. Thus a change in
the tariff rate raises the affiliates import cost which decreases the import of x, and thereby
reduce the production of *y . Giving increasing cost in the intra-firm trade and the
production of *y  relative to the marginal cost in producing y  in the home country the MNF
would be induced to increase the production of y .
A change in the tariff rate t  affects the production and sale of ky  in the host country
indirectly through its direct effect on *y . This is the strategic effect of a change in the tariff
rate. And if we define the strategic effect as
tt d
dy
dy
dy
d
dy kk *
*= (see Tirole 1988 ch.8) the sign
of
td
dyk  depends on whether the host firm regards the MNF affiliates final good as strategic
substitute or strategic complements11. Thus the sign of the term *ydy
d
k
p2  would be negative
in the case of strategic substitute and positive when the final goods in the host country are
considered as strategic complement. In quantity competition this term equals the change
in firm sk ' marginal revenue when the subsidiary firm adjust its output in response to a
change in the tariff. We know from (17) a change in the tariff rate induce the affiliate of the
MNF to reduce the production of *y . Firm k would increase (decrease) its output, if it
regards the final goods as strategic substitute (complement).
11 See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985)
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The import tariff negatively affects the MNF decision on the transfer price. The sign of
td
dpt
depends on kf RR ¢¢¢¢ . Since by assumption, the two final goods are substitutes, this implies
that 0
2
<
¶¶
¶
=¢¢ * kf yy
R p  and 0
2
<
¶¶
¶
=¢¢ *yy
R kk
p . The strategic effect alone dictates that the MNF
would under invoice when there is a change in tariff rate in order to minimise on tariff cost.
In the absence of strategic interaction the profit shifting motive indicates from (6) the MNF
to under invoice when t<T . The profit shifting motive and the strategic interaction effect
for the transfer price regime therefore move in the same direction and demands for the
MNF to choose a lower transfer price in order to save on tariff cost.
The analysis of the tax effects on the MNF decision variable remains the same as that of
the tariff effect as long as the tariff rate exceeds the relative differential in tax rate. Minor
changes in the tax rate are likely to have no effect on the firm’s strategy. In the event
where the relative differential in tax rate exceeds the tariff rate, the effect of an increase in
the tax rate in the importing country is opposite to the effect of increasing the tariff rate. To
interpret the tax effects, we recall that )1()( fhf tttT --= such that T  increases as
ft increases or ht decreases. If the host country tax rate increases, the MNF move up its
transfer price and the incentive for profit shifting from the host country is induced. The
increase in transfer price makes it advantageous to produce in the host country leading to
an increase in both affiliate output and intra-firm exports. Thus the profit tax rate have an
effect on both of the MNF’s marginal revenue functions, since an increase in the
production of both *y  and x results in a decrease in the marginal cost of production. The
MNF therefore exports more if it can manipulate the transfer price. Hence in the absence
of any tariff effects an increase in ft  increases the incentive for over-invoicing by the
MNF. Thus the direction the MNF strategically manipulates its transfer price is directly
related to the specific government tax policy. The higher the tax rate the higher the
transfer price. Alternatively, for a profit maximizing MNF a lower transfer price is optimal
for positive values of y  if ht decreases. Marginal profitability of producing y  falls and the
reductions in y  is induced 0<=
dT
dy . The general effects of the T on the MNF and the
host firm are presented in (16).
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5. Strategic Interaction and Host Firm Behaviour
The preceding analysis has establish that under Cournot competition when tax and tariff
rates are equal to zero, the strategic effect alone dictates a transfer price above marginal
cost in the presence of a penalty for transfer price manipulation. This section focuses on
the competitive behaviour of the host firm in the presence of transfer pricing activity of the
MNF. The transfer price set by the MNF affects the profitability of the affiliate firm directly,
whereas it affects the local rival firm only indirectly through the changed price or output of
the affiliate firm. Thus when transfer prices are observable, firms can use them
strategically to impact output (or price) decisions for the final product. The direction of the
distortion however depends on the strategic variable in the final good market. We are
interested in examining the equilibrium level of ky  (host firm output) when the MNF over
invoice or under invoice.
We consider first the high transfer price case. When quantity is the strategic variable, an
increase in the transfer price is equivalent to an increase in the marginal cost of the
affiliate firm. The direct effect is to lower output of the affiliate firm making it profitable for it
to set a high price on its sales in the host country for a given price of its local rival. The
best response of the local rival is to also set a high price if it regards the products as
strategic complements12. The intensity of competition between the affiliate and the rival is
diffused and the strategic interactive effects will reinforce each other to the mutual benefit
of both firms.
In the case of a lower transfer price, the importing affiliate becomes more aggressive and
is able to sell a larger quantity which helps to expand its own market share than it would
otherwise in the host country. If quantity is the strategic variable then the best response of
the local rival under lower transfer pricing regime of the MNF is to reduce its own sales.
This scenario leads to an increase in the affiliate’s output and profit and that of the MNF
as a whole. In quantity competition, a low transfer price is used to expand own market
share whiles within price competition the transfer price is used to defused competition.
The ability of the MNF to adjust its profit via transfer prices thus weakens the competitive
position of the local rival in the low transfer price regime than in the high transfer price
12 See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985)
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case. The implication is that the transfer price has a strategic value in addition to being an
instrument for profit shifting.
6. The Optimal Domestic Policy
Under transfer pricing considerations, the taxation of MNF has become an issue of public
concern. This is because recent work in international trade theory has shown that under
Cournot competition in imperfect markets firms have an additional incentive to shift profits
through transfer pricing manipulations when tax rates between countries differ. There is
also an additional motive for the use of strategic trade policy instruments such as profit tax
rate and tariff by competing governments to control such practices of MNFs to improve on
domestic welfare. The results of the previous section however suggest that the transfer
price regime and the strategic interaction between firms have important implications for
the effectiveness of these policies. This section considers profit tax policies.
National welfare of the home country is a function of only the MNF after tax profit and the
government’s net income. In this set up we do not take into consideration consumer
surplus as we assume output markets to be perfectly segmented (Brander and Spencer
1997). The government therefore sets its tax rate in order to maximize national welfare,
taking the taxes of the other country as given. The welfare function is represented as
follows
(18) )()1( LtW ffh bpp --+=
Where 0>¢b  is the marginal direct efficiency cost of public funds. The optimal value of ht
satisfies
(19)
h
t
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Noting that
hdt
dy* = 0 by first order condition (12) we can rewrite (19) as follows
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The first term is the profit-shifting effect due to a change in the domestic tax rate. The
second and the third terms are the tariff cost per unit of the exports and the profit shifting
effect due to transfer pricing respectively. We know that an increase in the home profit tax
rate positively affect the MNF’s exports and the transfer price and negatively affects the
MNF home production of the final good. The effect of an increase in the domestic country
profit tax rate is to decrease the domestic sale of the final good while the sale of the
foreign final good by the affiliate increases (see equation 16). This adjustment shift profits
due to Cournot competition from the home country to the foreign country when hCP ¢> . And
under assumption of downward demand function, the change in production of the final
good in the home country and foreign country leads to an increase in prices in the home
country whiles that in the foreign country declines. The welfare effect via domestic
production is therefore to decrease home country welfare. Thus while an increase in home
profit tax rate necessary raises the foreign tax revenue through the shift of profit, it may or
may not raise revenue of the home country.
The second term, which is the tariff effects on profit tax revenue, is clearly negative. And
this follows from the fact that an increase in the home tax rate raises total export to the
foreign country, the MNF must pay more tariff duties as a consequence of a higher x.
Thus per unit tariff cost increases and hence profits are decreased. When the home
country sets its profit tax rate optimally, the MNF over invoice, this decrease the MNF’s
profits belonging to the home country, thus the last term which is the profit shifting effect
due to transfer pricing is also negative. In the presence of high profit tax rate, the MNF
has an incentive to shift profits from the home country to the host country using the
transfer price.
Proposition 3. When fh tt ³ , profit shifting motive under Cournot competition and the profit
shifting under the strategic transfer pricing effect work in the same direction.
7. Conclusion
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This paper considers a model of transfer pricing and a multinational firm which engages in
Cournot competition with a local rival in the host country. The model analyses the effects
of varying tax/tariff rates on the transfer pricing behaviour of the MNF under a penalty
schema. The main focus is on direct regulation of the transfer price. It is shown that the
institution of a penalty has a substantial impact on the pricing behaviour of the MNF. The
optimal choice of the MNF in the presence of the penalty is to set a transfer price above
marginal cost of production. Thus transfer price regulation by the government leads to
over invoicing with a fall in affiliate firm output.
We studied the implications of government policy instruments, that is, the profit tax rate,
and the tariff rate on firm decision variables. The main results are as follows. (1) Changes
in the tax rate and the tariff rate have a direct and an indirect impact on the nature of the
competition and the degree of substitutability between the final good products. This is
because the nature of the strategic interaction in the final good market in the host country
has a great influence on the desired choice of the internal transfer price. (2) When the
MNF over invoice the optimal behaviour of the host rival firm is to set a high price on its
sales if it regards final products as strategic complements. In the under invoicing case
sales of the local rival are reduced weakening its competitive position vis-à-vis the MNF.
(3) For welfare implications under transfer price considerations a change in the tax rate
results in the profit shifting motive and the transfer pricing effect, move in the same
direction. Transfer pricing therefore has a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of both
the tax and tariff policies. These offer credible reasons for governments to be concerned
about transfer price manipulations by MNF. This is because national policies can create
incentive for firms to strategically engage in profit shifting by misrepresenting the cost of
intra-firm transfers.
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Dividing (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) by ),1( ft- ),1( ht- ),1( ft- and (A.5) by ),1( ft-  respectively
we obtain the following first order conditions as follows:
( ) [ ] 0)()( =-¢-- xpptxtxT tff dat                  (A.9)
0=¢-¢ hh CR                 (A.10)
0=¢-¢ ff CR                 (A.11)
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The comparative static results can be obtained from total differential of the first order
conditions to get the following system of equation.
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. Further letting D represent the determinant of the
left-hand matrix in (A.14) which is positive by assuming that the stability conditions hold or
equivalently that each firm’s marginal revenue declines as the output of any other firm
rises, the following comparative static effects can be obtained.
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